Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 11

Winter 2016

Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The Sound of One Hand
Clapping?
Neil Walker
Univeristy of Edinburgh, neil.walker@ed.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal
Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Walker, Neil (2016) "Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The Sound of One Hand Clapping?," Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol23/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The
Sound of One Hand Clapping?
NEIL WALKER*
ABSTRACT

Each operating in a presumptively general or universal register,
'public goods" and "human rights" are among the most popular and
visible contemporary carriers of ideas of global law and governance and
are therefore prime sources for any broader project of global justice.
Their combination, moreover, holds out the prospect of a fertile
engagement between the two core concerns of modern political moralityour collective requirements and potential (public goods) and our
individual dignity and well-being (human rights). Yet for all their
ambition, public goods and human rights each face the formidable
challenge of placing considerations of political authority and political
morality in productive balance. Exploring both, we face the frustrating
phenomenon of one hand clapping-a failure to reconcile authority and
morality in a satisfactory manner. The discourse of global public goods
presupposes rather than provides grounds for the relevant 'pviblic" and
so suffers from a general deficit of political authority. In turn, this
reinforces the incompleteness of its claim in political morality. The
discourse of human rights, perhaps surprisingly, reveals stronger
authoritative roots; however, these are locally situated, and the soil
becomes very thin as we move away from the state to the broaderglobal
environment and the familiaryet ethically abstracted moral discourse of
universal entitlement. In conclusion, I argue, it is precisely because both
of these dimensions of global ethics-public goods and human rightsface the same type of difficulty of the grounding political authority that
their conjunction in a single scheme does not allow either to compensate
for the deficiencies of the other.
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INTRODUCTION

In a thought-provoking analysis, Daniel Augenstein shines light on
an underexamined set of connections between two key terms in our
contemporary vocabulary of legal and political philosophy-public goods
and human rights-and explores how these connections help us to
address questions of planetary justice.1 In posing his title question "to
whom it may concern," he points us directly to the conflicted nature of
the ethics of responsibility for our global well-being. 2 On the one hand,
we hear the familiar open-ended call to all audiences to be "concerned,"
to take responsibility for what happens beyond the confines of the state
and its citizenry. On the other hand, if we put the rhetorical appeal of
the phrase to one side, a focus on the question "to whom" highlights the
problem of political authorship and so of political authority. Which of us,
by what means collectively constituted, has title and voice to assume
concern for global politics and public policy? Who is obliged to do so?
Who is justified in so doing? On what grounds? With what implications
for the content and extent of our common global commitments? And,
just as importantly, who has the mobilizing capacity to do so? These
questions remain as urgent (surely every one of us shares responsibility
for the many contemporary matters of palpable global concern, both
immediate and long-term) as their answers appear elusive (but just how
do we translate that shared responsibility into a defensible and effective
politics of intervention?).
"Public goods" and "human rights" each offer a partial set of
these answers overlapping or separate,
answers. But are
interdependent or independent, complementary or conflicting, complete
or incomplete in their combined import? Acknowledging that they deal
with distinct aspects of our global legal and political morality-the
value of human rights is not (or not only) that they are public goods, nor
is the value of public goods exhausted by their contribution to human
rights-Augenstein recognizes and examines some of the specific ways
in which they are nevertheless interdependent and potentially
complementary. But in so doing he leaves open the question of the
capacity of these two registers of political thought to provide, in
combination, a general answer to the challenge of how to work out and
operationalize our global ethics of collective responsibility.
Yet, for a number of reasons, that open question remains an
important and intriguing one. First, there is the question of profile to
which I alluded. Public goods and human rights are among the most
1. Daniel Augenstein, To Whom It May Concern: InternationalHuman Rights Law
and Global Public Goods, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225 (2016).
2. See id.
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popular and visible contemporary carriers of ideas of global law and
governance and are therefore prime candidates for any broader project
of global justice. 3 Secondly, each operates in a presumptively general or
universal register. Public goods should in principle be available to any
and all publics, while human rights purport to speak in the name of all
humanity. In both cases, therefore, the difficulty of freeing the relevant
conceptual apparatus from a state-centered frame of reference need not
be insurmountable. Thirdly, the two themes may appear to complement
each other in their coverage of the substantive domain of global ethics.
Whereas public goods focus on matters of collective provision, human
rights continue to place the individual at their ethical center. Their
combination, therefore, may hold out the prospect of a fertile
engagement between the two core concerns of modern political
morality-our social obligations, requirements, and potential on the one
hand, and our individual dignity and well-being on the other.
In this short paper, I address this question of the larger potential of
global public goods and human rights. In so doing, I take up a number of
the cues provided by Augenstein and also pursue some lines of my own.
My conclusion, however, is a skeptical one. For all their ambition, both
public goods and human rights face the formidable challenge of placing
considerations of political authority, on the one hand, and political
morality, on the other, in productive balance. In the exploration of both
themes, we are faced with the frustrating phenomenon of one hand
clapping-with a failure to reconcile authority and morality in a
satisfactory manner. On the one side, the discourse of global public
goods tends to suffer from a general deficit of political authority, which
in turn reinforces the incompleteness of its claim at the level of political
morality. On the other side, the discourse of human rights, perhaps
surprisingly, has stronger authoritative roots. However, these roots are
locally situated, and the soil becomes very thin as we move from the
state to the broader global environment and to the familiar, yet ethically
abstracted, moral discourse of universal entitlement. And in turn, I
argue, it is precisely because both of these dimensions of global ethicspublic goods and human rights-face the same type of difficulty that
their conjunction in a single scheme does not allow either to compensate
for the deficiencies of the other.

3. See generally NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW 55-130 (2015), for
discussion of the rise of public goods and human rights to prominence as candidate species
of global law.
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I. PUBLIC GOODS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE
Augenstein's critique of the application of the standard economistic
conception of public goods to a transnational setting follows a well-worn
track and ends up facing some familiar puzzles. The attraction of a
notion of public goods no longer confined within national boundariesfrom trade and environmental protection to climate change and
security-is not fundamentally different from its attraction at a
national level. Public goods provide presumptively politically
uncontentious and morally unobjectionable reasons for common action
on common problems, whether these sound at the national level, global
level, or any level in between.
Nonexcludability of access and nonrivalness in consumption are the
two defining features of the standard model of public goods. 4 These two
features account for the key characteristics-high production costs, freerider problems, and nonexhaustible benefits-that militate against their
5
adequate, efficient, or equitable provision by private market actors.
Basically, private actors tend to lack either the means or the motivation
to supply such goods, and to the extent that they are able and willing to
supply, they are inclined to do so in an unnecessarily restrictive
manner. This explains why such goods ought to instead be supplied and
enjoyed as public goods.
Yet, these defining features are matters of degree. Most public
goods, whether on a national or a global scale, are not "pure" public
goods. Instead, access to them may be restricted in some measure due to
human intervention and technical manipulation. They may also be
susceptible to depletion through consumption. In addition, to the extent
that public goods retain the attributes of nonexcludability and
nonrivalness and so may be more effectively provided publicly rather
than privately, this does not place such provision beyond criticism nor
beyond the realm of political contention. Such public provision may still
vary significantly in intensity and quality. The benefits it bestows will
be received and experienced unevenly between different groups, while
the balance and trade-off between different public goods involves
independent value choices over which disagreement remains inevitable.
These objections apply regardless of the type of public goods with
which we are concerned. On the one hand, there are purely instrumental
public goods, such as clean air, street lighting, or the provision of other
general utilities, where the emphasis is on the public means of delivery.
On the other hand, there are communal public goods, where the public
4. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 387, 387 (1954).
5. See id. at 387-89.
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good in question makes reference not only to the collective modality and
instrument of provision but also to the collective context of its
enjoyment. Such communal goods are public goods because the good in
question is accomplished and appreciated in (relatively nonexcludable
and nonrival) common across a particular community. I am referring to
goods such as living in a tolerant society, living in an educated society,
or even-to take the case where our two categories do directly
intersect-living in a society that respects human rights. We are also
referring to a further subcategory of "essentially communal goods" such
as a common language, fraternity, or solidarity, 6 where the good in
question does not merely refer to a benefit that will be communally
generated and widely shared within a given community but a benefit
that is realized as an experience in common; that is to say, the very
enjoyment of the good requires and therefore implies its simultaneous
7
enjoyment by others.
If we turn our attention specifically to public goods on a global scale,
whether instrumental or communal, we can identify a double political
deficit-the two elements of which are closely related. First, as I have
already touched on, there remains a deficit of political morality that is
already well known at the national level. To identify something as a
public good tells us only that we should make public provision for it, not
precisely what that provision should be. There will inevitably be
winners and losers and disputed priorities in the elaboration of each
good. The precision of instrumental public goods suffers from inevitable
disputation over what counts as an adequate means and level of
provision, while the precision of communal public goods suffers from the
abstractness of their specification. The relationship between the various
goods is also highly contestable. As Augenstein points out, specification
of the overall "public good" to which various goods should contribute and
which should inform the terms and balance of their realization also
remains absent within the specialist and mutually compartmentalized
discourses of public goods.8
Secondly, there is a deficit of political authority. Here, the global
level acquires its own peculiar vulnerabilities. To name something as a
public good does not tell us how we should make provision for it. We call
something a public good because the mismatch between our interest in
its benefit and our individual and joint motivation to provide it speaks
6. See Jeremy Waldron, Can Communal Goods be Human Rights? in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 354-59 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1993).
7. See generally, for example, IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 7393 (2007); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 255-62 (1986); Waldron, supra note 6,
for discussion of distinction between instrumental and communal public goods.
8. See Augenstein, supra note 1, at 231.
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to a collective-action problem. But it begs the question to say that this
requires an equivalent at the global level to the state as public
institution and public-good provider at the national level. We simply do
not have such institutions in place, or at least have them only unevenly
and often embryonically or of fragile standing (think of global public
health or climate change regimes, for example, not to speak of global
educational regimes). This, in turn, reflects back on two interlinked
problems
of political morality. One problem concerns
the
aforementioned indeterminacy and attendant controversy over the
justifiable substantive terms of the provision of global public goods. The
problem of precision becomes amplified at the global level precisely
because we often lack institutions that have the legitimate authority to
make difficult choices over the level and quality of provision. A second,
underlying problem concerns the satisfaction of the threshold case for
public provision at the level of the global or transnational community to
complement the largely accepted need for its provision at the nationstate level. This is particularly so at the level of communal public goods.
To accept the need for instrumental public goods at the global level in
areas such as climate change and disease control requires only an
informed and enlightened self-interest-a sense that our own
community well-being depends upon the well-being of other
communities being similarly secure-and a level of mutual trust
sufficient to ground the credibility of common commitments made on the
basis of such enlightened self-interest. Even here, the difficulties of
making common institutional cause remain profound. Yet, to accept the
need at the global level for communal public goods such as the common
benefits of living in mutually tolerant communities, educated
communities, or communities in which we value the varied riches of our
artistic or wider cultural inheritance, the global level requires
something more-a prior recognition that, for some purposes of our
community membership and participation, the globe itself (or some
significant part of it) counts as the relevant unit of society at which the
unit-wide distribution and shared enjoyment of a good presumptively
matters to all sharers.
So we should not be surprised that we struggle to find the political
means to provide any, still less a sufficient, authoritative mechanism of
public-goods provision at the global level. To think otherwise-to
assume that the broad need for something that requires collective
provision, even if that broad need comes to be broadly acknowledged,
will lead to agreement over its collective provision-is to commit a
functionalist fallacy or at least to live in excessive functionalist hope.
We can better understand both the attractions and the limitations of
the public-goods approach if we locate it within a broader framework of
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philosophical thought about global justice. 9 Crudely, we can understand
the requirements of global justice in terms of three different models of
global connectedness. We can order these progressively from thinner to
thicker expectations of joint action and conceptions of underlying
connectedness: first, there is a model of concurrent interests; second,
there is a model of mutual responsibility; and third, there is a model of
common concern.
The concurrent-interests model concentrates on those areas where,
regardless of cultural and ethical differences, we are manifestly
interdependent in certain key domains of social life. In these domains,
the globe has become a community of palpably common risk and
interwoven life chances. The emphasis is on clear and often urgent
areas of shared and interactive predicaments and prospects between
states and peoples, where both the common harm or benefit and the fact
that we have been and remain in a position to act to cause or prevent
such harm or secure such benefit to one another, is undeniable and
unavoidable. 1 0
The mutual-responsibility model reaches beyond the manifest
interdependence of the concurrent-interests model to find a deeper seam
of causation and associated obligation. The guiding premise here, today
perhaps most forcefully portrayed and most extensively developed in the
work of Thomas Pogge,'1 is that the very arrangement of the world into
sovereign states and their peoples (with the international resource,
borrowing, treaty, and arms privileges consecrated by that statesovereigntist arrangement), and the institutional configuration of statecentered international law and politics that reflects this, is no neutral
framework or international "state of nature." Rather, it is a background
structure with significant and uneven effects on the global distribution
of benefits and burdens. In particular, the historical embedding and
perpetuation of these arrangements in ways that systematically favor
some parts of the globe over others, specifically those that have been
prominent in the original design and continuing refinement of the
system, accounts for many of the world's deep inequalities, including the
catastrophe of global poverty. It follows from this deeper investigation of
the causal dynamics of the world order that those states and their
citizens who are responsible for inequalities and other distributive
injustices are under a duty to correct or mitigate the harm that they
9. See generally KIMBERLY HUTCHINGS, GLOBAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010)

(explaining how to frame the discussion of ethical problems in a global context).
10. This remains the most common framework for thinking about questions of global
justice both within the political classes and in the academy. See, e.g., id. at 1-27.
11. See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 184 (2d ed. 2008)
(detailing the way the formation of states continues the cycle of poverty).
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have caused, which requires a level of compensatory common action
much greater than under the concurrent-interests model.
Finally, the common-concern model argues for a deeper framework
of mutual commitment and obligation precisely in view of our common
humanity. 12 It is neither the proximity of our actions and action-effects
nor the greater or lesser interdependence due to that proximity which
leads us to take responsibility for each other, or to recognize concurrent
interests and the associated entanglement of predicaments and
prospects, but rather it is a deeper affinity and solidarity as members of
the same species.
All three models become increasingly salient under conditions of
globalization. Our manifest interdependence increases in the face of
climate change, pandemic disease, global insecurity, and similar
problems. So too does recognition of the deeper dynamics of the
interdependence of our life chances, as does also, partly on account of
this denser web of interconnections, a cosmopolitan awareness of our
common human condition. Yet the solutions and responses suggested
are different. The public-goods approach, certainly in its instrumental
dimension, clearly belongs to the first model-that of concurrent
interests, with its emphasis on manifest interdependence. Even
communal public goods, though they speak at least minimally to some
prior sense of global community and the common concern that implies,
also respond to the concurrent-interests model to the extent that they
argue for the provision of goods (for example, human rights protection
for all and toleration of other cultures) that need not involve high levels
of resource redistribution and that remain directly relevant to the
satisfaction of one's own local interests. In general terms, the second
and third models, with their thicker sense of common ties, are more
likely to generate notions of global economic redistribution, social
reform, and enhanced global institutional capacity that go beyond those
we associate with public goods.
Of course, the different approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is
perfectly possible to subscribe to the concurrent-interests, mutualresponsibility, and common-concern models together. Most who
subscribe to the public-goods model would make at least some
concession to the other two. For example, this may be through
recognition of the moral jeopardy of untrammeled state sovereignty and
a concern to mitigate its effects through doctrines of humanitarian
intervention and basic rights protection under the mutual-responsibility

12. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 150-95 (2d ed.
2004); PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE 8

(1996).
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model; 13 or through acknowledgement of at least minimum standards of
species-wide humanitarian assistance,1' 4 or recognition of a minimum
sense of global community in respect of communal public goods, under
the common-concern model.
Yet, for all that, important differences remain. The stress upon one
rather than the other of the three approaches tends to reveal distinct
and, in some measure, rival mentalities of global governance. And the
mentality of global governance associated with the public goods
approach is undoubtedly a presumptively modest one. It involves no
deep interrogation of the underlying state system and assumes that
much public provision should tend to remain state-based and statejustified. It assumes the global political sphere to be merely
supplementary and one that is both truncated in terms of its
consideration of -common ends and the search for a deliberated
international consensus (truncated because its emphasis is largely on
areas of close interdependence and already apparent manifest common
cause) and fragmented in form (fragmented because it tends to deal
with the public goods associated with each of these areas discretely). 15
This still leaves open the overall vision to which the adoption of the
public-goods approach in any particular instance is linked. The modesty
of a public-goods approach may reflect an overall modesty of ambition
and justification of intervention in matters of global justice on the part
of its sponsors. Or its modesty may be more strategic or instrumental,
merely a recognition of the need to establish a secure platform of basic
goods before moving on to deeper and more contentious matters. In this
regard, the sense of prior global community implicit in the public-goods
approach, however lightly registered, hints at a more progressive
attitude. So too does the easy semantic link, made by Augenstein and
others, between the multiplicity of global public goods and the singular
global public good-the latter a standard that beckons us to take into
13. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for InternationalLaw, 41 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 2 (2013) (explaining the complex relationship between state sovereignty and
international law).
14. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113,
118 (2005) (stating that, regardless of the method, justice demands that the well-off help
those in poverty). See generally, JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) (discussing
how the law of peoples developed from liberal ideas of justice).
15. The precise mode of treatment will differ depending on whether we are dealing
with single-shot, aggregate, or weakest-link public goods, but in any case, our current
transnational institutional infrastructure seems weakly equipped and vulnerable to
capture by strong ideological or epistemic interests. See e.g., Gregory Schaffer,
InternationalLaw and Global Public Goods in a Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 669,
681-82 (2012); Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: InternationalLaw in an Age of Global
Public Goods,108 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 20 (2014).
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account not only concurrent interests but also mutual responsibilities
and common concerns.
But whether the approach is intrinsic and limited in final ambition
or strategic and unlimited, it is that same modesty of immediate vision
and orientation that questions or restricts the value of the public-goods
approach. As I have argued, the public-goods approach tries to sidestep
the problem of political authority through the apparent self-evidence of
its objectives at the level of political morality. But here we encounter
the first problem of one hand clapping. Any effective solution at the
level of political morality is likely to be undermined by the absence of
political authority. The two hands need to meet. If they do not do so on
account of a deficit of political authority, the claims of substance at the
level of political morality may either overreach and fail to be
implemented or be prey to unilateral implementation by a nonglobally
representative, yet hegemonic, political power. 16 More likely in the case
of most global public goods, it may underreach in compensation for a
lack of political authority. In addition, the lack of political authority is
liable to be reinforced by the poverty of transnational public political
engagement and mobilization that any such narrow and fragmented
agenda of institutional treatment of global public goods is apt to
generate.
II. RIGHTS BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND HUMANITY
If the problem of global public goods is that their intended
contribution at the level of substantive political morality is not matched
at the level of political authority-which in turn weakens what can be
resolved at the level of political morality-to what extent, if any, can the
discursive and institutional possibilities of international human rights
help tackle the problem?
Augenstein makes two interesting moves toward answering this
question. First, he uses an expansive notion of human rights as a way of
treating the problem of political authority-accounting for why and how
it is that certain levels of political community do authoritatively resolve
to put and keep things in common. 17 Second, he argues that there is
something dynamic and reflexive in this process; that is, human rights
16. See generally Jtirgen Habermas, Does the Constitutionalization of International
Law Still Have a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115 (Ciaran Cronin ed., 2006)
(examining the constitutionalization of international law with regards to the political
authority, political morality, and political power). Here Habermas's main concern is to
critique the role of the United States as an "enlightened hegemon" in the unipolar political
world of the opening years of the 21st century.
17. See Augenstein, supra note 1, at 236.
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are not simply the glue of an already settled sense of political
community.' 8 Although human rights are that in part, they are also a
lubricant that can unsettle existing conceptions of the boundaries of
political community. These two moves are captured in Augenstein's idea
that human rights are "constitutive" in relation to "the (overall) public
good" as this is defined by, and in turn defines, a community.
To begin with, there is the basic question of the constitutive role of
human rights in the generation of political community. Augenstein's key
insight here is that human rights are integral to the fashioning of
political community inasmuch as they contribute "to the legitimation of
state power by re-presenting the general interest of the polity that is not
reducible to the aggregated economic self-interest of 'isolated' liberal
individuals or the provision of functionally differentiated public
goods." 19 That is to say, whereas public goods speak to a deracinated
notion of what outcomes are good for any community and whereas a
certain narrow sense of liberal rights speaks in a universal register and
so is likewise deracinated, a broader conception of human rights allows
the community to give particular meaning to its polity-to become the
co-authors of its own specific version of an overall public good that
includes, but is not exhausted by, the aggregation of public goods or the
protection of economic freedom. That broader conception is one that
refers, in Habermasian terms, to the "co-originality" of private
autonomy (through economic and other liberty rights) and public
autonomy (through political rights) in the making of political
community and also refers to their symbiosis-with political freedom
20
dependent upon the exercise of personal freedom and vice versa.
Certain features of the structure of rights protection help reinforce this
idea of a particularizing function, including their polity-pervasive, crosssectoral remit and their typical textual qualification by considerations of
"common interest," "public policy," and similar terms. It seems,
therefore, both that human rights are part of the basic recipe,
universally applicable, for the making of political community and that
they supply the distinguishing and particularizing ingredient "baked
into" the dish that any particular constituency of "we, the people" might
serve up.
I have reservations about just how much work the idea of rights
might be required to do within our political ethics from this

18. Id. at 239.
19. Id. at 241.

20. See, e.g., Jirgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of
ContradictoryPrinciples?,29 POL. THEORY 766, 767 (2001) (elaborating on the philosophy
of "co-originality").
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perspective. 21 It is not clear to what extent a vernacular conception of
rights contributes to a common sense of political morality sufficient to
transform our picture of public goods in aggregate into a thickly
mediated sense of the public good; and insofar as rights are conducive of
political community, much of the weight must be borne, not by the basic
category of liberty rights, but by the "public autonomy" process rights of
democratic voice and political participation. This point will be pursued
in due course, yet, for the moment, let us give Augenstein his due. For
he insists on an important point when he indicates how human rights
do not simply represent the universal dimension in our political
morality, as many assume, but are also a source of its particularizing
dimension and of the sense of legitimate authority associated with the
collective articulation of that particularizing dimension.
In making that point, however, Augenstein stresses the open-ended
and critically reflexive quality of the search for human rights. For him,
"a political collective that commits to protecting human rights empowers
its members to invoke humanity against the polity." 22 Clearly, the
invocation of humanity speaks to the capacity of the citizenry of the
polity to take a critical stance and to adapt and revise their
understanding of how rights are implicated in their political community.
But of more relevance to us, it also opens the door to the consideration
of the relationship between the polity in question and wider human
rights claims issuing from beyond the polity. For if, as Augenstein
suggests, the proper relationship between the particular polity and
general humanity is the reflexive inquiry that always lies at the heart of
human rights claims, then it is a challenge that can be posed-and a
claim that in principle should be capable of being raised-by outsiders
affected by the actions of a polity as much as by insiders. As Augenstein
says, this is already implicit in the protection of human rights we accord
to resident non-citizens as well as to state citizens and, more
pertinently, in the shifting and expanding international law
jurisprudence on the extra-territorial human rights obligations of
states.

23

I have considerable sympathy for the idea of the field of human
rights developing in accordance with an ongoing dialectic of the
particular and the universal. In other work, I have tried to show that it
is the irreducible element of universality in all human rights
21. See generally Neil Walker, Constitutionalismand the Incompleteness of Democracy:
An Iterative Relationship, 39 RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE 206 (2010) (Neth.)
(explaining that the complex relationship between democracy and modern
constitutionalism needs to be understood better for today's global world).
22. Augenstein, supra note 1, at 239.
23. See id. at 243.
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discourse-the claim to speak on behalf of all humanity and of their
claims as equal rights-holders-that has led to a powerful rhetorical
inclusiveness and expansiveness of rights-holding communities and a
similar open-endedness of subject matter. 24 On the one hand, the
remorseless claim to universality carries obvious dangers, as it can lead
to illegitimate generalization from very specific modes of life, interest
constellations, and conceptions of human flourishing. Yet, on the other
hand, the insistent ambition of universalism invites alternative or
additional narratives of rights in the same universal code. Since the
post-War formation of the United Nations and its Declaration of Human
Rights, there has been a dramatic world-wide expansion of rights
charters and their "indivisible" range of subject matter (including
second-generation socio-economic rights and third-generation group and
collective rights) in national and international charters and their
institutional supports. 25 This expansion has been driven by assumptions
of a universalism of personal scope in rights language and of an internal
relationship between the idea of rights protection and a notion of human
agency and dignity that entitles human agents to become reflexively
responsible for the best understanding of what their human rights
catalogue includes. 26 And in this expansion, we can see not just a onesided particularism but a gradual invocation and partial reconciliation
of different particular visions of human rights at higher levels of
agreement and institutionalization.
But, beyond these rhetorical and legal-textual developments, we
must be careful how far the language of rights will take us in effectively
complementing a global language of public goods. It is telling that
Augenstein continues to focus on states as the basic units of rights
production and protection (and, of course, of their violation and
encroachment) in a globalizing world. He does stress the extent to which
the rights-based responsibilities of states increasingly extend beyond
their territories, especially as regards the question of the occupation of
foreign territories and the various transnational public goods and
"bads," in particular peace and (in)security, which may be associated
24. See generally Neil Walker, Universalism and Particularism in Human Rights:
Trade-Off or Productive Tension?, in HUMAN RIGHTS: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW POSSIBILITIES
(David Kinley et al. eds., 2013) (describing the element of universality in all human rights
discourse).
25. Ever since the Vienna Declaration was adopted at the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna in 1993, the "universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated"
character of human rights has been routinely stressed in the public discourse of
transnational human rights. See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).
26. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?, in
PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF HuMAN RIGHTS 117-125 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015).
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with such occupation. 27 Yet, as vigorous as the International Court of
Justice and U.N. Treaty bodies, in particular the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, have been in promoting
extraterritorial application, this remains a secondary field of activity
behind the domestic-rights jurisdiction of states.
What is more, the international institutional and normative
architecture of rights protection within and around the United Nations,
however densely developed, remains an external source of instruction
and exhortation to states to modify their actions, rather than a signal of
the emergence of regional or global political communities with their own
state-independent authoritative foundations. Indeed, in the one place
where the rescaling of political community beyond the state has made
significant advances, namely the regional case of the European Union,
the driving force has not been human rights. Rather, it has been the
expanding common political objectives of the supranational entity, with
human rights playing a complementary but essentially subsidiary role
in reaction to and as a secondary influence on these expanding common
28
objectives.
The nub of the matter is that while human rights can be
authoritatively "constitutive" of the political community of the state in
the sense that, as Augenstein indicates, they play a key role in the
imaginative reconstruction of community as something other than and
beyond "a predetermined ethical self-understanding of the national
community,"' 29 they still require that presupposition of national
community-and all the sociological ingredients of common life that
makes such a presupposition possible-as a point of collective
orientation for their work of political imagination. There remains an
important respect in which the "constitutive" construction through
rights of national political community, and, more pertinently, of any
other potential level of political community beyond the state, can only
get off the ground if there is an existing cultural affinity-a
30
rudimentary "we feeling"-of which it can supply a reconstruction.

27. See Augenstein, supra note 1, at 234.
28. See, e.g., Armin Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights
Organization?Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 COMMON MET. L.
REV. 1307, 1308, 1335, 1338 (2000) (explaining the focus and control of human rights
when implemented by institutions).
29. Augenstein, supra note 1, at 239.
30. See, e.g., Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an
Ontology of Collective Selfhood, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT
POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 9, 9-20 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2008)
(explaining the problems of political affinity).
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III.

THE INAUDIBILITY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE

In the final analysis, we cannot wish for what is not plausibly
available to us. As Augenstein seeks to complement and moderate the
pursuit of global public goods, presented as a modestly progressive but
still institutionally light and culturally detached transnational force of
political morality, with a human rights-centered force of political
authority, he is surely correct to insist that the authoritative roots-if
not the imaginative heights-of human rights discourse remain located
within the state rather than at some higher level of political
institutionalization. 31 Yet, despite this mismatch of levels, can human
rights supply an effective accompaniment and stimulus in the register
of global political authority to the construction of the public good, more
broadly conceived, in the register of global political morality?
I doubt, in conclusion, that this is the case. In the final analysis,
human rights discourse possesses a dual and interrelated legacy that
limits its ambition at the global level. Not only do the authoritative
foundations of rights and rights enforcement remain firmly statecentered; in addition, and closely associated with that statecenteredness, the original and "first generational" form of rights has
been one of shielding individuals from the excesses of political power
and so, more specifically, from the various governmental organs of the
state-understood as the monopolistic holder of political power of the
modern age. And while the shift toward extraterritorial jurisdiction and
toward viewing human rights claims as imposing positive as well as
negative obligations on states-as swords as well as shields-is an
ongoing affair, 32 the magnetic center of human rights law is still the
domestic state environment and the liberal project of constraining state
power over individuals within that statist box. 33 That structural bias is
reinforced by longstanding doctrines of sovereign autonomy and
noninterference that continue to serve as a brake upon all attempts to
extend the responsibility of states for those of their rights-related

31. See Augenstein, supranote 1, at 225.
32. See, e.g., Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: In Which
InternationalHuman Rights Law FindsNew Ways to Tame Global CorporatePower, INT'L
J. HUM. RTS. 1, 3-12 (2015) (regarding the developing area of state responsibility for the
extra-territorial human rights violations of global business entities registered within the
home jurisdiction).
33. See generally ANDREW VINCENT, THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010) (stressing
the continuing civilizing effect of national structures and standards in sponsoring
international human rights protection today; describing national citizens' rights, which
remain predominately negative rights against the state, as "mentors" of international
human rights).
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actions and action-consequences that are experienced beyond their
borders.
This suggests how far what remains a basically locally cultivated
human rights discourse-its easy resonance in the contemporary
circuits of international law and policy notwithstanding-is from
providing the authoritative ballast for the development of a more
expansively justice-sensitive conception of the public good at a global
level. More generally, this conclusion, in demonstrating the problems
encountered even by such promisingly open-ended candidates as human
rights and public goods, reminds us of how difficult it is to adapt any
34
nationally nurtured legal or political discourse to global requirements.
Once again we see (and do not hear) one hand clapping-this time the
old hand of state-based political authority. Yet, absent the kind of fertile
transnational cultural soil in which distinctively political rights of
public autonomy can become embedded anew and actively reemployed, 35 but which, crucially, such rights cannot independently
generate, the prospect of this hand being brought together with the
hand of an expansively engaged and developed conception of the global
public good in the name of global justice remains dim. 36 The ensuing
silence indicates just how much any such broader conception struggles
to be heard within our existing constellation of political authority.
The contribution of the idea of global public goods and of human
rights, separately and in combination, to the alleviation of global
wrongs, must remain, therefore, a decidedly less ambitious one. Indeed,
I believe that Augenstein and I are in basic agreement on this, and that,
in fact, is why he devotes his analysis to the intricacies of the modest
contribution global public goods and human rights can make to the
improvement of international law and politics rather than to the larger
canvas of global justice. Yet, that modest contribution is also one that
becomes all the more important in light of the very elusiveness of any
project carrying a higher global ambition. I hope to have illustrated this

34. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 178-203.
35. See Habermas, supra note 20, at 767.
36. See POGGE, supra note 11. Pogge seeks to use a rights-based argument to add
ballast to his case for a mutual-responsibility-based redistribution of resources to alleviate
global poverty. He argues that our domestic position as rights-holders within Western
states makes us co-responsible for those structurally advantaged economic policies of
Western states and their governments that cause global poverty. Yet, whatever its longterm merits as frame-changing, transformative political philosophy, an argument that
deploys a traditionally state-internal, noninterference-based discourse of legal authority to
authorize a state-external, interventionist-based program of action remains institutionally
implausible today. In other words, in terms of our understanding of the claims that can be
effectively made under the existing state-sovereigntist framework of legal and political
authority, Pogge's approach lacks traction.
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elusiveness by examining the difficulties confronting our twin themes'
own candidature for any such exalted task.

